Pond – a non-instant messaging protocol by Adam Langley

Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup

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Pond

- Forward-secure asynchronous messaging (not email!)
- No spam
  - communication allowed only if authorized (key exchange)
- No visible traffic pattern
  - connections made at random intervals (dummy or real send/fetch)
  - fixed length messages
- More details see https://pond.imperialviolet.org/

How Pond Works

- Pond consists of users and servers
- Servers
  - provide availability
    users need not to be online simultaneously
- Users:
  - communicate only with servers
    - own server to receive messages
    - recipient's server to send a message
  - make connections periodically
    time between each connection is exponentially distributed

Messages

- Stored on server until they are fetched
- Auto-erased after fixed amount of time (currently 1 week)
- Padded to a fixed size
- Encouraged to be acknowledged
  - reply to a message
  - send an acknowledgment
- Server does not learn who sender is

Crypto Components

- Curve25519
- Salsa20
- Poly1305
- HMAC-SHA256
- Rijndael (with 256-bit block)
- EKE2: key exchange
- DH ratchet: encryption
  - forward secure through symmetric-key updating
  - future secure through DH ratchet key updating
- Ed25519: public-key signature
- BBS: group signature

DH Ratchet: keys

- consists of sender and receiver version
- generated using HMAC-SHA256 from DH key

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- DH-ratchet key: (A_i, B_j)
  - generated unrelatedly from previous key
- chain key: $CK_{(A_i,B_j)}$
  - derived from DH-ratchet key
  - used for forward-secrecy updating
- message key: $m_{(A_i,B_j)}$
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  - newly generated per message
- header key, next header key
  - used to encrypt DH-ratchet key sent to receiver

DH Ratchet: flow

Alice
(A_0, B_0)

Bob
(A_0, B_0)

DH Ratchet: flow

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



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

Bob

(A_0, B_0)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Network Diagram

Server1

User1

$G_{i\ pub}$: Group i public key

$G_{i\ sk[j]}$: Group i secret key of member j

$S_{i\ pub}$: Server i public key

$U_{i\ serv}$: User i home server

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Network Diagram: receive



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Network Diagram: send



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BBS Group Signature

- Messages signed by a member in a group
  - Group_i: people authorized to send to i
- Server cannot learn which member of the group signed
- Revocation:
  - all previous signatures become invalid
  - each member has to update their private keys

BBS Group Signature: computational cost

- Precomputation:
  - 3 pairings (cached by both signers and verifiers)
  - 1 pairing (cached by signers)
- Sign:
  - 8 (multi-) exponentiations (7 in G_1, 1 in G_T)
  - 0 pairing
- Verify:
  - 6 multi-exponentiations (4 in G_1, 1 in G_2, 1 in G_T)
  - 1 pairing

Note: pairing $e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T$

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Comment: This is not (yet) how Pond is implemented.

Future Research

- Open problems:
  - Formalize security assumptions
  - Prove protocol secure (or modify to make proof work)
- Desired feature:
  - Friends introduction
    A knows B and C; how can A introduces B to C?
  - Scalability: how can this scale?